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FED. INS. v. LAKE SHORE
(Cont.)
the outer limits" of due process, Triplett v. R.M. Wade& Co., 261
S.C. 419 (1973)) had to be applied to determine whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction met the requirements of due
process. The Court noted that, "the constitutional touchstone
remains whether the defendant purposefully established
'minimum contacts' in the forum," Burger King v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 467, 474 (1985) "such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' " International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945) quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
Under the facts, the Court found that the defendant's contact
with the forum state did not suggest a purposefulness, and thus
personal jurisdiction could not be asserted without offending
notions of due process.
The court also rejected Federal's argument that defendants
were subject to South Carolina's personal jurisdiction under a
stream of commerce theory. Citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1986), the Court noted that factors
such as marketing and advertising by defendants in the forum
state which might make a stream of commerce theory applicable
were lacking. Moreover, in this case, defendants' products were
transported into the forum by a consumer. To allow the state to
use this as a means of exercising personal jurisdiction over
defendants would effectively mean that, "amenability to suit
would travel with the chattel." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980). Also, this case did not
involve multiple deliveries of units into South Carolina over a
period of years. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122. Though the court did not
reject out of hand a stream of commerce theory, such a theory
clearly did not apply in this case.

Finally, the court rejected Federal's assertion that the nature
of an ocean-going vessel (designed and manufactured) to go
from port to port is such that it sustains the exercise of personal
juridsiction. Recognizing that the Supreme Court had already
rejected such an argument in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
at 296 n.11, the court added that all products are mobile to some
extent and a product-by-product approach tb personal jurisdiction
would succeed only in drawing courts into an arcane and litigi
ous search for meaningless distinctions. Thus, the question to
ask in assessing whether personal jurisdiction can properly be
asserted is not as to the nature of the product, but the nature of
the defendants' contacts with the forum state.
Upon these findings, the Court held that it would not be
reasonable for personal jurisdiction to be asserted over defendants,
that this was sufficient independent grounds for dismissal. In
support of this conclusion, the court noted certain factors that
should be considered in determining whether the assertion of
personal jurisdiction offends due process requirements. The
court included among the factors; the defendant's burden in
litigating in the forum, the forum state's interest, the plaintiffs
interest in obtaining relief in the forum, the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies and the shared interest of the several states in
furthering fundamental social policies. In this case, the court
found that the defendant's contacts with the state of South
Carolina are insufficient to warrant the proper assertion of
personal jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, the court affirmed
the district court judgment granting defendants' motion to dis
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Alex Barnett '9 1

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. v. L & L MARINE SERVICE INC.
United States Court of Appeals, Eight Circuit, 6 July1989
87 5F.2 d1351
Negligence by the operators of a vessel does not act to supervene the owners absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel
for the voyage intended. All the resulting damages will be allocated by the comparative degree of fault of the parties. The
work by a tug of pulling the vessel off a shoal is properly classified as towage rather than salvage.
FACTS: The barge Apex Chicago and the tug Maya went aground
off the coast of Massachusetts on October 19, 1981, while en
route from Carteret, New Jersey to Boston, Massachusetts. The
crew of the tug were employees of L & L Marine Service (L&LJ,
which operated the barge and tug under an agreement with
Apex Towing (Apex). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) had issued small craft advisories along
the route and upgraded them to gale warnings by 6:00 PM on
October 18th. Instead of heeding the warnings, the Maya left
the protected waters of Long Island Sound and proceeded into
the open waters of Block Island Sound and Rhode Island Sound.
While in Rhode Island Sound early on the morning of October
19th, severe weather was encountered, consisting of winds up to
35 knots, squalls, zero visibility and ten foot seas. During this
rough leg of the voyage, the towing cable parted. Due to the
intensity of the storm, the crew did not realize that the barge
had come adrift for thirty minutes. Expert testimony showed
that the breaking strength of the tow cable was significantly
lower than that required by industry standards. This problem
was exacerbated by the fact that the crew could not let out more
cable to reduce the stress. The cable could not be slacked, because
the winch had an antiquated manual release mechanism that
was dangerous to operate in rough weather. By the tme the crew
of the Maya sighted the barge Apex Chicago, she was aground
on the Hen and Chicken Shoals, leaking gasoline through a
gash in her hull. While attempting to pull the barge from the
rocks, the tug further damaged the barge before going aground.
The stranded tug and barge were freed when aU.S. Coast Guard
vessel and two private tugs, the Chicopee and the Jaguar, arrived.
The Jaguar pulled the Maya free with a floating hawser that
had been connected by Coast Guard personnel; the Maya pulled
the Apex Chicago free, and then the Jaguar and the Chicopee

towed the two vessels to port where the cargo was lightered. In
the aftermath of the accident, American Home Assurance Co.
(American) paid several sizable claims to, or on behalf of, Apex
Oil Company (Apex Oil). These claims included one by the
Jaguar for "salavage" of the Maya. As a subrogee of Apex Oil,
American brought an action against L&L to recover the damages
resulting from the accident, which American alleges were prox
imately caused by the negligent operation of the Maya by L&L's
crew. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri, awarded judgment to American for one half of the
sum of provable damages based on the comparative degree of
fault of the parties. American appealed the decision.
ISSUES: 1) Is the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel qualified
by an assumption that the crew will navigate the vessel out of
harm's way?
2) Was the allocation of damages according to the
comparative degree of fault proper?
3) Was the Jaguar's pulling of the Maya off the
shoals properly classified as "salvage" or "towage"?
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals, for the Eight Circuit, affirm
ing in part and vacating in part, held that the duty of the owner
to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute. This absolute duty is
not qualified by an assumption that the crew will navigate the
vessel out of harm's way and is defined by the vessel's intended
voyage, the hazards likely to be encountered and the vessel's
·
ability to withstand these hazards. The measure of a vessel's
seaworthiness is not a function of her crew's skill and foresight
in navigation. The behavior of L&L's crew was negligent, but
the substantially understrength cable and obsolete stern winch
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AMER. HOME v. L & L MARINE (Cont.)
contributed equally to the accident and the weather encountered
was not so unusual as to be unforeseeable.
The resulting damages were properly allocated among the
parties proportionally according to the comparative degree of
their fault. L&L had neither a vessel interest nor a cargo interest
and could not be considered a contributing participant in a

proper, it did not include the costs of hull repair and cargo
lightering. For this reason the damage award is vacated and
remanded for reconsideration.
.
The work done by the tug Jaguar was properly classified as
towage. It was the Cost Guard vessel on the scene that actually
performed the crucial act of rescue by attaching the floating
hawser to the Maya, and the Jaguar then merely pulled the

common nautical venture. L&L was sued merely as a tortfeasor
and the concept of general-average adjustment, as used by the
other parties to adjust the damages among themselves, does not
apply. While the district court's allocation of damages was

Maya off the Shoal. The finding of the district court that this
work would properly be classified as towage rather than salvage
was affirmed.
Stephen W. Beyer '92

CALIFORNIA HOME BRANDS, INC.

v. FERREIRA

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 28 March1989
871 F.2 d830
Shipowner cannot sue seaman, whose negligence allegedly caused injury to co-seaman, for indemnification or contribution
based upon shipowner's Jones Act liability to said co-seaman.
FACTS: In January 1985, Manuel Rebelo, a crewmember of
the M/V Pan Pacific, sustained personal injuries on board the
vessel. Rebelo filed a claim for maintenance and cure. In re
sponse to Rebelo's claim, the shipowners, California Home
Brands Inc. (CHB), commenced an action for declaratory relief,
denying responsibility for maintenance and cure. Rebelo
counterclaimed for negligence under the Jones Act, unsea
worthiness, and maintence and cure.
CHB commenced a separate action against Danny Ferreira,
a co-seaman, for contribution and/or indemnification, claiming
Ferreira's puported negligence contributed to Rebelo's injuries.
Ferreira, moved to dismiss CHB's complaint and after a hearing,
the trial court held that CHB's suit against its own employee for
indemnity and contribution was barred as a matter of law.
ISSUE: Is a shipowner-employer who may be liable to an
injured seaman-employee under the Jones Act entitled to such
indemnity and contribution from a co-seaman whose negligence
allegedly caused the injury?
ANALYSIS: In its affirmation of the district court's decision,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered judgement for
Ferreira despite numerous arguments by CHB for indemnification
and contribution.
The Court explicitly declined to recognize conventional land
based tort liability theories regarding indemnity or contribution
from fellow employees, continuing to be guided by rules specifically
developed in the context of maritime employment.
Traditional maritime law recognized only two claims by a
seaman injured in the course of employment - a seaman injured
while on board a vessel was entitled to "maintenance and cure"
(which included wages until the end of the voyage), and recovery
of damages for injuries sustained due to the unseaworthiness of
the ship The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). A vessel owner's duty
to provide such "maintenance and cure" is implied as part of the
employment contract, and this duty is not subject to abrogation
by the parties. Similarly, the owner's duty to provide a seaworthy
ship is absolute; once a seaman proved that his injuries were
caused by the unseaworthy condition of the vessel or its equipment,
the shipowner was liable regardless of fault. Carlisle Packing
Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1912). The common law concept
of negligence as a basis for tort liability was not extended to
employment injuries at sea until passage of the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. §688 (1920), which created a negligence right of action
for seamen against their employers. CHB argued that if Congress
had intended to protect seamen from personal liability, the
Jones Act would have included an express immunizing provision.
The Court refused to accept this rationale, stating that the
purpose of the Act was to benefit and protect seamen by enlarging
the remedies available to them. The Court concluded that to
interpret the statute to allow lawsuits against seamen would

frustrate the beneficial purpose of the Act.
CHB attempted to further advance its cause of action against
Ferreira under principles of maritime indemnity and contribution
established under two prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and Refitting Corp., 342
U.S. 482 (1952) andCooperStevedoringCorp. Inc. v.FritzKople
Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974). In Halcyon, a shipowner was sued by a
longshoreman for injuries sustained on board a vessel. The
shipowner sought to implead the longshoreman's employer,
who was otherwise exempted by statute, as a third party de
fendant. The Supreme Court held that no right of contribution
existed in such non-collision maritime cases. In Cooper, an
injured longshoreman sued the vessel owner, who later imp
leaded the non employer, stevedoring company as a third party
defendant. The Supreme Court held that the vessel owner was
entitled to implead such stevedoring company as a joint tort
feasor. CHB's attempt to wed these holdings to the facts of the
case at bar was held to be too sweeping. The Court indicated that
unless a direct cause of action exists by one seaman against
another for shipboard injuries, the employer can have no right of
indemnification or contribution from the employee.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's hold
ing that before any statutory rights were created, a seaman
could not sue his co-employee for negligence. The Court in
interpreting the Jones Act concluded that Ferreira could not be
directly liable to Rebelo and therefore, no basis existed for
CHB's claim for indemnity against Ferreira. See, CHB. Foods,
Inc. v. Rebelo, 662 F.Supp. 1359 (S.D.CAL.1987).
CHB also argued that it had a right to indemnity from Fer
reira on an implied contractual basis, citing the "primary duty
rule" adopted in Reinhart u. United States, 475 F.2d 151 (9th
Cir. 1972). (Seaman-employee may not recover from his employer
for injuries caused by his own failure to perform a duty imposed
on him by his employment.) The Court held that Reinhart had
no application in this case because the primary duty rule works
only to bar a plaintiffs suit for damages when his injury resulted
from his own breach. It does not create any rights against third
parties. Given the conditions of maritime employment, the imp
lication of a covenant of workmanlike performance running
from the seaman to his employer and entitling the latter to
indemnity is not a reasonable one. SeeFlunker v. UnitedStates,
528 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975).
Finally, the policy arguments advanced by CHB for indemnity
and contribution were rejected by the Court as not in keeping
with the history and purpose of the Jones Act. The Court cone
! uded that to subject a seaman to the costs of defending a lawsuit
by his employer and the threat of ultimate liability would place
an intolerable burden on what is already considered a difficult
occupation. See Socony-Vacume Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424
(1939).
Alfonso C. Pistone '91
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